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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”  15 
U.S.C. § 45(a).  In 2005 the Federal Trade Commission began 
bringing administrative actions under this provision against 
companies with allegedly deficient cybersecurity that failed to 
protect consumer data against hackers.  The vast majority of 
these cases have ended in settlement. 
 On three occasions in 2008 and 2009 hackers 
successfully accessed Wyndham Worldwide Corporation’s 
computer systems.  In total, they stole personal and financial 
information for hundreds of thousands of consumers leading 
to over $10.6 million dollars in fraudulent charges.  The FTC 
filed suit in federal District Court, alleging that Wyndham’s 
conduct was an unfair practice and that its privacy policy was 
deceptive.  The District Court denied Wyndham’s motion to 
dismiss, and we granted interlocutory appeal on two issues: 
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whether the FTC has authority to regulate cybersecurity under 
the unfairness prong of § 45(a); and, if so, whether Wyndham 
had fair notice its specific cybersecurity practices could fall 
short of that provision.1  We affirm the District Court. 
I. Background 
A. Wyndham’s Cybersecurity 
 Wyndham Worldwide is a hospitality company that 
franchises and manages hotels and sells timeshares through 
three subsidiaries.2  Wyndham licensed its brand name to 
approximately 90 independently owned hotels.  Each 
Wyndham-branded hotel has a property management system 
that processes consumer information that includes names, 
home addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, 
payment card account numbers, expiration dates, and security 
codes.  Wyndham “manage[s]” these systems and requires the 
hotels to “purchase and configure” them to its own 
specifications.  Compl. at ¶ 15, 17.  It also operates a 
computer network in Phoenix, Arizona, that connects its data 
center with the property management systems of each of the 
Wyndham-branded hotels. 
                                              
1 On appeal, Wyndham also argues that the FTC fails the 
pleading requirements of an unfairness claim.  As Wyndham 
did not request and we did not grant interlocutory appeal on 
this issue, we decline to address it. 
 
2 In addition to Wyndham Worldwide, the defendant entities 
are Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC, Wyndham Hotels and 
Resorts, LCC, and Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc.  For 
convenience, we refer to all defendants jointly as Wyndham. 
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 The FTC alleges that, at least since April 2008, 
Wyndham engaged in unfair cybersecurity practices that, 
“taken together, unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed 
consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”  
Id. at ¶ 24.  This claim is fleshed out as follows. 
 1. The company allowed Wyndham-branded hotels to 
store payment card information in clear readable text. 
 2. Wyndham allowed the use of easily guessed 
passwords to access the property management systems.  For 
example, to gain “remote access to at least one hotel’s 
system,” which was developed by Micros Systems, Inc., the 
user ID and password were both “micros.”  Id. at ¶ 24(f). 
 3. Wyndham failed to use “readily available security 
measures”—such as firewalls—to “limit access between [the] 
hotels’ property management systems, . . . corporate network, 
and the Internet.”  Id. at ¶ 24(a). 
 4. Wyndham allowed hotel property management 
systems to connect to its network without taking appropriate 
cybersecurity precautions.  It did not ensure that the hotels 
implemented “adequate information security policies and 
procedures.”  Id. at ¶ 24(c).  Also, it knowingly allowed at 
least one hotel to connect to the Wyndham network with an 
out-of-date operating system that had not received a security 
update in over three years.  It allowed hotel servers to connect 
to Wyndham’s network even though “default user IDs and 
passwords were enabled . . . , which were easily available to 
hackers through simple Internet searches.”  Id.  And, because 
it failed to maintain an “adequate[] inventory [of] computers 
connected to [Wyndham’s] network [to] manage the devices,” 
it was unable to identify the source of at least one of the 
cybersecurity attacks.  Id. at ¶ 24(g). 
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 5. Wyndham failed to “adequately restrict” the access 
of third-party vendors to its network and the servers of 
Wyndham-branded hotels.  Id. at ¶ 24(j).  For example, it did 
not “restrict[] connections to specified IP addresses or grant[] 
temporary, limited access, as necessary.”  Id.  
 6. It failed to employ “reasonable measures to detect 
and prevent unauthorized access” to its computer network or 
to “conduct security investigations.”  Id. at ¶ 24(h). 
 7. It did not follow “proper incident response 
procedures.”  Id. at ¶ 24(i).  The hackers used similar methods 
in each attack, and yet Wyndham failed to monitor its 
network for malware used in the previous intrusions. 
 Although not before us on appeal, the complaint also 
raises a deception claim, alleging that since 2008 Wyndham 
has published a privacy policy on its website that overstates 
the company’s cybersecurity.  
We safeguard our Customers’ personally 
identifiable information by using industry 
standard practices.  Although “guaranteed 
security” does not exist either on or off the 
Internet, we make commercially reasonable 
efforts to make our collection of such 
[i]nformation consistent with all applicable laws 
and regulations.  Currently, our Web sites 
utilize a variety of different security measures 
designed to protect personally identifiable 
information from unauthorized access by users 
both inside and outside of our company, 
including the use of 128-bit encryption based on 
a Class 3 Digital Certificate issued by Verisign 
Inc.  This allows for utilization of Secure 
Sockets Layer, which is a method for 
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encrypting data.  This protects confidential 
information—such as credit card numbers, 
online forms, and financial data—from loss, 
misuse, interception and hacking.  We take 
commercially reasonable efforts to create and 
maintain “fire walls” and other appropriate 
safeguards . . . . 
Id. at ¶ 21.  The FTC alleges that, contrary to this policy, 
Wyndham did not use encryption, firewalls, and other 
commercially reasonable methods for protecting consumer 
data. 
B. The Three Cybersecurity Attacks 
 As noted, on three occasions in 2008 and 2009 hackers 
accessed Wyndham’s network and the property management 
systems of Wyndham-branded hotels.  In April 2008, hackers 
first broke into the local network of a hotel in Phoenix, 
Arizona, which was connected to Wyndham’s network and 
the Internet.  They then used the brute-force method—
repeatedly guessing users’ login IDs and passwords—to 
access an administrator account on Wyndham’s network.  
This enabled them to obtain consumer data on computers 
throughout the network.  In total, the hackers obtained 
unencrypted information for over 500,000 accounts, which 
they sent to a domain in Russia. 
 In March 2009, hackers attacked again, this time by 
accessing Wyndham’s network through an administrative 
account.  The FTC claims that Wyndham was unaware of the 
attack for two months until consumers filed complaints about 
fraudulent charges.  Wyndham then discovered “memory-
scraping malware” used in the previous attack on more than 
thirty hotels’ computer systems.  Id. at ¶ 34.  The FTC asserts 
that, due to Wyndham’s “failure to monitor [the network] for 
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the malware used in the previous attack, hackers had 
unauthorized access to [its] network for approximately two 
months.”  Id.  In this second attack, the hackers obtained 
unencrypted payment card information for approximately 
50,000 consumers from the property management systems of 
39 hotels. 
 Hackers in late 2009 breached Wyndham’s 
cybersecurity a third time by accessing an administrator 
account on one of its networks.  Because Wyndham “had still 
not adequately limited access between . . . the Wyndham-
branded hotels’ property management systems, [Wyndham’s 
network], and the Internet,” the hackers had access to the 
property management servers of multiple hotels.  Id. at ¶ 37.  
Wyndham only learned of the intrusion in January 2010 when 
a credit card company received complaints from cardholders.  
In this third attack, hackers obtained payment card 
information for approximately 69,000 customers from the 
property management systems of 28 hotels. 
 The FTC alleges that, in total, the hackers obtained 
payment card information from over 619,000 consumers, 
which (as noted) resulted in at least $10.6 million in fraud 
loss.  It further states that consumers suffered financial injury 
through “unreimbursed fraudulent charges, increased costs, 
and lost access to funds or credit,” Id. at ¶ 40, and that they 
“expended time and money resolving fraudulent charges and 
mitigating subsequent harm.”  Id.  
C. Procedural History 
 The FTC filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona in June 2012 claiming that Wyndham 
engaged in “unfair” and “deceptive” practices in violation of 
§ 45(a).  At Wyndham’s request, the Court transferred the 
case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
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Wyndham then filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss both 
the unfair practice and deceptive practice claims.  The District 
Court denied the motion but certified its decision on the 
unfairness claim for interlocutory appeal.  We granted 
Wyndham’s application for appeal. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 
 The District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).   
 We have plenary review of a district court’s ruling on 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6).  Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  In this review, “we accept all factual allegations 
as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief.”  Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
III. FTC’s Regulatory Authority Under § 45(a)  
A. Legal Background 
 The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 prohibited 
“unfair methods of competition in commerce.”  Pub. L. No. 
63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)).  Congress “explicitly considered, and 
rejected, the notion that it reduce the ambiguity of the phrase 
‘unfair methods of competition’ . . . by enumerating the 
particular practices to which it was intended to apply.”  FTC 
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972) 
(citing S. Rep. No. 63-597, at 13 (1914)); see also S. Rep. No. 
63-597, at 13 (“The committee gave careful consideration to 
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the question as to whether it would attempt to define the 
many and variable unfair practices which prevail in 
commerce . . . .  It concluded that . . . there were too many 
unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into 
the law it would be quite possible to invent others.” (emphasis 
added)).  The takeaway is that Congress designed the term as 
a “flexible concept with evolving content,” FTC v. Bunte 
Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 353 (1941), and “intentionally left [its] 
development . . . to the Commission,” Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 
381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965).  
 After several early cases limited “unfair methods of 
competition” to practices harming competitors and not 
consumers, see, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 
(1931), Congress inserted an additional prohibition in § 45(a) 
against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce,” Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 5, 52 
Stat. 111, 111 (1938). 
 For the next few decades, the FTC interpreted the 
unfair-practices prong primarily through agency adjudication.  
But in 1964 it issued a “Statement of Basis and Purpose” for 
unfair or deceptive advertising and labeling of cigarettes, 29 
Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964), which explained that the 
following three factors governed unfairness determinations:  
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily 
having been previously considered unlawful, 
offends public policy as it has been established 
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—
whether, in other words, it is within at least the 
penumbra of some common-law, statutory or 
other established concept of unfairness; (2) 
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes 
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substantial injury to consumers (or competitors 
or other businessmen). 
Id.  Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court implicitly 
approved these factors, apparently acknowledging their 
applicability to contexts other than cigarette advertising and 
labeling.  Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244 n.5.  The Court also held 
that, under the policy statement, the FTC could deem a 
practice unfair based on the third prong—substantial 
consumer injury—without finding that at least one of the 
other two prongs was also satisfied.  Id.  
 During the 1970s, the FTC embarked on a 
controversial campaign to regulate children’s advertising 
through the unfair-practices prong of § 45(a).  At the request 
of Congress, the FTC issued a second policy statement in 
1980 that clarified the three factors.  FTC Unfairness Policy 
Statement, Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford and 
Hon. John Danforth, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and 
Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980), appended to Int’l Harvester Co., 104 
F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984) [hereinafter 1980 Policy Statement].  
It explained that public policy considerations are relevant in 
determining whether a particular practice causes substantial 
consumer injury.  Id. at 1074–76.  Next, it “abandoned” the 
“theory of immoral or unscrupulous conduct . . . altogether” 
as an “independent” basis for an unfairness claim.  Int’l 
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. at 1061 n.43; 1980 Policy 
Statement, supra at 1076 (“The Commission has . . . never 
relied on [this factor] as an independent basis for a finding of 
unfairness, and it will act in the future only on the basis of the 
[other] two.”).  And finally, the Commission explained that 
“[u]njustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the 
FTC Act” and that such an injury “[b]y itself . . . can be 
sufficient to warrant a finding of unfairness.”  1980 Policy 
Statement, supra at 1073.  This “does not mean that every 
consumer injury is legally ‘unfair.’”  Id.  Indeed,  
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[t]o justify a finding of unfairness the injury 
must satisfy three tests. [1] It must be 
substantial; [2] it must not be outweighed by 
any countervailing benefits to consumers or 
competition that the practice produces; and [3] 
it must be an injury that consumers themselves 
could not reasonably have avoided. 
Id. 
 In 1994, Congress codified the 1980 Policy Statement 
at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n): 
The Commission shall have no authority under 
this section . . . to declare unlawful an act or 
practice on the grounds that such act or practice 
is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.  In determining whether an act or 
practice is unfair, the Commission may consider 
established public policies as evidence to be 
considered with all other evidence.  Such public 
policy considerations may not serve as a 
primary basis for such determination. 
FTC Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108 
Stat. 1691, 1695.  Like the 1980 Policy Statement, § 45(n) 
requires substantial injury that is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers and that is not outweighed by the benefits to 
consumers or competition.  It also acknowledges the potential 
significance of public policy and does not expressly require 




B. Plain Meaning of Unfairness 
 Wyndham argues (for the first time on appeal) that the 
three requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) are necessary but 
insufficient conditions of an unfair practice and that the plain 
meaning of the word “unfair” imposes independent 
requirements that are not met here.  Arguably, § 45(n) may 
not identify all of the requirements for an unfairness claim. 
(While the provision forbids the FTC from declaring an act 
unfair “unless” the act satisfies the three specified 
requirements, it does not answer whether these are the only 
requirements for a finding of unfairness.)  Even if so, some of 
Wyndham’s proposed requirements are unpersuasive, and the 
rest are satisfied by the allegations in the FTC’s complaint.  
 First, citing FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Brother, Inc., 291 
U.S. 304 (1934), Wyndham argues that conduct is only unfair 
when it injures consumers “through unscrupulous or unethical 
behavior.”  Wyndham Br. at 20–21.  But Keppel nowhere 
says that unfair conduct must be unscrupulous or unethical.  
Moreover, in Sperry the Supreme Court rejected the view that 
the FTC’s 1964 policy statement required unfair conduct to 
be “unscrupulous” or “unethical.”  405 U.S. at 244 n.5.3  
                                              
3 Id. (“[Petitioner] argues that . . . [the 1964 statement] 
commits the FTC to the view that misconduct in respect of 
the third of these criteria is not subject to constraint as 
‘unfair’ absent a concomitant showing of misconduct 
according to the first or second of these criteria. But all the 
FTC said in the [1964] statement . . . was that ‘[t]he wide 
variety of decisions interpreting the elusive concept of 
unfairness at least makes clear that a method of selling 
violates Section 5 if it is exploitive or inequitable and if, in 
addition to being morally objectionable, it is seriously 
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Wyndham points to no subsequent FTC policy statements, 
adjudications, judicial opinions, or statutes that would suggest 
any change since Sperry. 
 Next, citing one dictionary, Wyndham argues that a 
practice is only “unfair” if it is “not equitable” or is “marked 
by injustice, partiality, or deception.”  Wyndham Br. at 18–19 
(citing Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988)).  
Whether these are requirements of an unfairness claim makes 
little difference here.  A company does not act equitably when 
it publishes a privacy policy to attract customers who are 
concerned about data privacy, fails to make good on that 
promise by investing inadequate resources in cybersecurity, 
exposes its unsuspecting customers to substantial financial 
injury, and retains the profits of their business. 
 We recognize this analysis of unfairness encompasses 
some facts relevant to the FTC’s deceptive practices claim.  
But facts relevant to unfairness and deception claims 
frequently overlap.  See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 
767 F.2d 957, 980 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The FTC has 
determined that . . . making unsubstantiated advertising 
claims may be both an unfair and a deceptive practice.”); 
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1367 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (“[A] practice may be both deceptive and 
unfair . . . .”).4  We cannot completely disentangle the two 
                                                                                                     
detrimental to consumers or others.’” (emphasis and some 
alterations in original, citation omitted)). 
 
4 The FTC has on occasion described deception as a subset of 
unfairness.  See Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. at 1060 (“The 
Commission’s unfairness jurisdiction provides a more general 
basis for action against acts or practices which cause 
significant consumer injury. This part of our jurisdiction is 
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theories here.  The FTC argued in the District Court that 
consumers could not reasonably avoid injury by booking with 
another hotel chain because Wyndham had published a 
                                                                                                     
broader than that involving deception, and the standards for 
its exercise are correspondingly more stringent . . . .  
[U]nfairness is the set of general principles of which 
deception is a particularly well-established and streamlined 
subset.”); Figgie Int’l, 107 F.T.C. 313, 373 n.5 (1986) 
(“[U]nfair practices are not always deceptive but deceptive 
practices are always unfair.”); Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 
F.T.C. 263, 363 n.78 (1986).  So have several FTC staff 
members.  See, e.g., J. Howard Beales, Director of the Bureau 
of Consumer Protection, FTC, Marketing and Public Policy 
Conference, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, 
Fall, and Resurrection (May 30, 2003) (“Although, in the 
past, they have sometimes been viewed as mutually exclusive 
legal theories, Commission precedent incorporated in the 
statutory codification makes clear that deception is properly 
viewed as a subset of unfairness.”); Neil W. Averitt, The 
Meaning of “Unfair Acts or Practices” in Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Geo. L.J. 225, 265–66 
(1981) (“Although deception is generally regarded as a 
separate aspect of section 5, in its underlying rationale it is 
really just one specific form of unfair consumer practice . . . .  
[For example, the] Commission has held that it is deceptive 
for a merchant to make an advertising claim for which he 
lacks a reasonable basis, regardless of whether the claim is 
eventually proven true or false . . . .  Precisely because 
unsubstantiated ads are deceptive in this manner, . . . they also 
affect the exercise of consumer sovereignty and thus 




misleading privacy policy that overstated its cybersecurity.  
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 
by Defendant at 5, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. 
Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. 13-1887) (“Consumers 
could not take steps to avoid Wyndham’s unreasonable data 
security [before providing their personal information] because 
Wyndham falsely told consumers that it followed ‘industry 
standard practices.’”); see JA 203 (“On the reasonabl[y] 
avoidable part, . . . consumers certainly would not have 
known that Wyndham had unreasonable data security 
practices in this case . . . .  We also allege that in 
[Wyndham’s] privacy policy they deceive consumers by 
saying we do have reasonable security data practices.  That is 
one way consumers couldn’t possibly have avoided providing 
a credit card to a company.”).  Wyndham did not challenge 
this argument in the District Court nor does it do so now.  If 
Wyndham’s conduct satisfies the reasonably avoidable 
requirement at least partially because of its privacy policy—
an inference we find plausible at this stage of the litigation—
then the policy is directly relevant to whether Wyndham’s 
conduct was unfair.5 
 Continuing on, Wyndham asserts that a business “does 
not treat its customers in an ‘unfair’ manner when the 
business itself is victimized by criminals.”  Wyndham Br. at 
                                              
5 No doubt there is an argument that consumers could not 
reasonably avoid injury even absent the misleading privacy 
policy.  See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy 
Online: Consumer Decision-Making Strategies and the 
Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. Ill. J.L. 
Tech. & Pol’y. 1 (arguing that consumers may care about data 
privacy, but be unable to consider it when making credit card 
purchases).  We have no occasion to reach this question, as 
the parties have not raised it. 
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21 (emphasis in original).  It offers no reasoning or authority 
for this principle, and we can think of none ourselves.  
Although unfairness claims “usually involve actual and 
completed harms,” Int’l Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1061, “they 
may also be brought on the basis of likely rather than actual 
injury,” id. at 1061 n.45.  And the FTC Act expressly 
contemplates the possibility that conduct can be unfair before 
actual injury occurs. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (“[An unfair act or 
practice] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury” 
(emphasis added)).  More importantly, that a company’s 
conduct was not the most proximate cause of an injury 
generally does not immunize liability from foreseeable harms.  
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449 (1965) (“If the 
likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is 
the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor 
negligent, such an act[,] whether innocent, negligent, 
intentionally tortious, or criminal[,] does not prevent the actor 
from being liable for harm caused thereby.”); Westfarm 
Assocs. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 
688 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Proximate cause may be found even 
where the conduct of the third party is . . . criminal, so long as 
the conduct was facilitated by the first party and reasonably 
foreseeable, and some ultimate harm was reasonably 
foreseeable.”).  For good reason, Wyndham does not argue 
that the cybersecurity intrusions were unforeseeable. That 
would be particularly implausible as to the second and third 
attacks.   
 Finally, Wyndham posits a reductio ad absurdum, 
arguing that if the FTC’s unfairness authority extends to 
Wyndham’s conduct, then the FTC also has the authority to 
“regulate the locks on hotel room doors, . . . to require every 
store in the land to post an armed guard at the door,” 
Wyndham Br. at 23, and to sue supermarkets that are “sloppy 
about sweeping up banana peels,” Wyndham Reply Br. at 6.  
The argument is alarmist to say the least.  And it invites the 
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tart retort that, were Wyndham a supermarket, leaving so 
many banana peels all over the place that 619,000 customers 
fall hardly suggests it should be immune from liability under 
§ 45(a). 
 We are therefore not persuaded by Wyndham’s 
arguments that the alleged conduct falls outside the plain 
meaning of “unfair.” 
C. Subsequent Congressional Action 
 Wyndham next argues that, even if cybersecurity were 
covered by § 45(a) as initially enacted, three legislative acts 
since the subsection was amended in 1938 have reshaped the 
provision’s meaning to exclude cybersecurity.  A recent 
amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act directed the FTC 
and other agencies to develop regulations for the proper 
disposal of consumer data.  See Pub. L. No. 108-159, 
§ 216(a), 117 Stat. 1952, 1985–86 (2003) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681w).  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act required the FTC to establish standards for financial 
institutions to protect consumers’ personal information.  See 
Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501(b), 113 Stat. 1338, 1436–37 
(1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b)).  And 
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act ordered the FTC 
to promulgate regulations requiring children’s websites, 
among other things, to provide notice of “what information is 
collected from children . . . , how the operator uses such 
information, and the operator’s disclosure practices for such 
information.”  Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1303, 112 Stat. 2681, 
2681-730–732 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6502).6  Wyndham contends these “tailored grants of 
                                              
6 Wyndham also points to a variety of cybersecurity bills that 
Congress has considered and not passed.  “[S]ubsequent 
legislative history . . . is particularly dangerous ground on 
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substantive authority to the FTC in the cybersecurity field 
would be inexplicable if the Commission already had general 
substantive authority over this field.”  Wyndham Br. at 25.  
Citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 143 (2000), Wyndham concludes that Congress excluded 
cybersecurity from the FTC’s unfairness authority by 
enacting these measures. 
 We are not persuaded.  The inference to congressional 
intent based on post-enactment legislative activity in Brown 
& Williamson was far stronger.  There, the Food and Drug 
Administration had repeatedly disclaimed regulatory 
authority over tobacco products for decades.  Id. at 144.  
During that period, Congress enacted six statutes regulating 
tobacco.  Id. at 143–44.  The FDA later shifted its position, 
claiming authority over tobacco products.  The Supreme 
Court held that Congress excluded tobacco-related products 
from the FDA’s authority in enacting the statutes.  As tobacco 
products would necessarily be banned if subject to the FDA’s 
regulatory authority, any interpretation to the contrary would 
contradict congressional intent to regulate rather than ban 
tobacco products outright.  Id. 137–39; Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530–31 (2007). Wyndham does not argue 
that recent privacy laws contradict reading corporate 
cybersecurity into § 45(a).  Instead, it merely asserts that 
Congress had no reason to enact them if the FTC could 
already regulate cybersecurity through that provision.  
Wyndham Br. at 25–26. 
 We disagree that Congress lacked reason to pass the 
recent legislation if the FTC already had regulatory authority 
over some cybersecurity issues.  The Fair Credit Reporting 
                                                                                                     
which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute when it 
concerns . . . a proposal that does not become law.”  Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990). 
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Act requires (rather than authorizes) the FTC to issue 
regulations, 15 U.S.C. § 1681w (“The Federal Trade 
Commission . . . shall issue final regulations requiring . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); id. § 1681m(e)(1)(B) (“The [FTC and 
other agencies] shall jointly . . . prescribe regulations 
requiring each financial institution . . . .” (emphasis added)), 
and expands the scope of the FTC’s authority, id. 
§ 1681s(a)(1) (“[A] violation of any requirement or 
prohibition imposed under this subchapter shall constitute an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce . . . and shall 
be subject to enforcement by the [FTC] . . . irrespective of 
whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any 
other jurisdictional tests under the [FTC] Act.”).  The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act similarly requires the FTC to 
promulgate regulations, id. § 6801(b) (“[The FTC] shall 
establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions 
subject to [its] jurisdiction . . . .”), and relieves some of the 
burdensome § 45(n) requirements for declaring acts unfair, id. 
§ 6801(b) (“[The FTC] shall establish appropriate standards . 
. . to protect against unauthorized access to or use of . . . 
records . . . which could result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience to any customer.” (emphasis added)).  And the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act required the FTC to 
issue regulations and empowered it to do so under the 
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, id. § 6502(b) 
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 553), rather than the more burdensome 
Magnuson-Moss procedures under which the FTC must 
usually issue regulations, 15 U.S.C. § 57a.  Thus none of the 
recent privacy legislation was “inexplicable” if the FTC 
already had some authority to regulate corporate 
cybersecurity through § 45(a). 
 Next, Wyndham claims that the FTC’s interpretation 
of § 45(a) is “inconsistent with its repeated efforts to obtain 
from Congress the very authority it purports to wield here.”  
Wyndham Br. at 28.  Yet again we disagree.  In two of the 
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statements cited by Wyndham, the FTC clearly said that some 
cybersecurity practices are “unfair” under the statute.  See 
Consumer Data Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 2011 WL 2358081, at *6 (June 15, 2011) 
(statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, FTC) (“[T]he 
Commission enforces the FTC Act’s proscription against 
unfair . . . acts . . . in cases where a business[’s] . . . failure to 
employ reasonable security measures causes or is likely to 
cause substantial consumer injury.”); Data Theft Issues: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade 
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 2011 WL 1971214, 
at *7 (May 4, 2011) (statement of David C. Vladeck, 
Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection) (same). 
 In the two other cited statements, given in 1998 and 
2000, the FTC only acknowledged that it cannot require 
companies to adopt “fair information practice policies.”  See 
FTC, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the 
Electronic Marketplace—A Report to Congress 34 (2000) 
[hereinafter Privacy Online]; Privacy in Cyberspace: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade & Consumer 
Prot. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 1998 WL 546441 (July 
21, 1998) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC).  
These policies would protect consumers from far more than 
the kind of “substantial injury” typically covered by § 45(a).  
In addition to imposing some cybersecurity requirements, 
they would require companies to give notice about what data 
they collect from consumers, to permit those consumers to 
decide how the data is used, and to permit them to review and 
correct inaccuracies.  Privacy Online, supra at 36–37.  As the 
FTC explained in the District Court, the primary concern 
driving the adoption of these policies in the late 1990s was 
that “companies . . . were capable of collecting enormous 
amounts of information about consumers, and people were 
suddenly realizing this.”  JA 106 (emphasis added).  The FTC 
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thus could not require companies to adopt broad fair 
information practice policies because they were “just 
collecting th[e] information, and consumers [were not] 
injured.”  Id.; see also Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s 
Motion to Dismiss, No. 9357, slip op. at 7 (Jan. 16, 2014) 
[hereinafter LabMD Order or LabMD] (“[T]he sentences 
from the 1998 and 2000 reports . . . simply recognize that the 
Commission’s existing authority may not be sufficient to 
effectively protect consumers with regard to all data privacy 
issues of potential concern (such as aspects of children’s 
online privacy) . . . .” (emphasis in original)).  Our conclusion 
is this: that the FTC later brought unfairness actions against 
companies whose inadequate cybersecurity resulted in 
consumer harm is not inconsistent with the agency’s earlier 
position. 
 Having rejected Wyndham’s arguments that its 
conduct cannot be unfair, we assume for the remainder of this 
opinion that it was. 
IV. Fair Notice 
 A conviction or punishment violates the Due Process 
Clause of our Constitution if the statute or regulation under 
which it is obtained “fails to provide a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so 
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously 
discriminatory enforcement.”  FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Wyndham claims that, 
notwithstanding whether its conduct was unfair under § 45(a), 
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the FTC failed to give fair notice of the specific cybersecurity 
standards the company was required to follow.7 
A. Legal Standard 
 The level of required notice for a person to be subject 
to liability varies by circumstance.  In Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, the Supreme Court held that a “judicial 
construction of a criminal statute” violates due process if it is 
“unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which 
had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.”  378 U.S. 
347, 354 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001); In re Surrick, 
338 F.3d 224, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2003).  The precise meaning of 
“unexpected and indefensible” is not entirely clear, United 
States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005), but we and 
our sister circuits frequently use language implying that a 
conviction violates due process if the defendant could not 
reasonably foresee that a court might adopt the new 
interpretation of the statute.8 
                                              
7 We do not read Wyndham’s briefing as raising a meaningful 
argument under the “discriminatory enforcement” prong. A 
few sentences in a reply brief are not enough. See Wyndham 
Reply Br. at 26 (“To provide the notice required by due 
process, a statement must in some sense declare what conduct 
the law proscribes and thereby constrain enforcement 
discretion . . . .  Here, the consent decrees at issue . . . do not 
limit the Commission’s enforcement authority in any way.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 
8 See Ortiz v. N.Y.S. Parole, 586 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the “unexpected and indefensible” standard 
“requires only that the law . . . not lull the potential defendant 
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 The fair notice doctrine extends to civil cases, 
particularly where a penalty is imposed.  See Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2317–20; Boutilier v. INS, 387 
U.S. 118, 123 (1967).  “Lesser degrees of specificity” are 
allowed in civil cases because the consequences are smaller 
than in the criminal context.  San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 
F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1992).  The standards are especially 
lax for civil statutes that regulate economic activities.  For 
those statutes, a party lacks fair notice when the relevant 
standard is “so vague as to be no rule or standard at all.”  
                                                                                                     
into a false sense of security, giving him no reason even to 
suspect that his conduct might be within its scope.”  
(emphases added)); In re Surrick, 338 F.3d at 234 (“[We] 
reject [the] contention that . . . nothing in the history of [the 
relevant provision] had stated or even foreshadowed that 
reckless conduct could violate it.  Indeed, in view of the 
foregoing, the [state court’s] decision . . . was neither 
‘unexpected’ nor ‘indefensible’ by reference to the law which 
had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.”  (emphases 
added)); Warner v. Zent, 997 F.2d 116, 125 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(“‘The underlying principle is that no man shall be held 
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)); 
id. at 127 (“It was by no means unforeseeable . . . that the 
[court] would [construe the statute as it did].” (emphasis 
added)); see also Lata, 415 F.3d at 112 (“[S]omeone in [the 
defendant’s] position could not reasonably be surprised by 
the sentence he eventually received . . . .  We reserve for the 
future the case . . . in which a sentence is imposed . . . that is 
higher than any that might realistically have been imagined at 




CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Phila., 703 F.3d 612, 631–32 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).9  
 A different set of considerations is implicated when 
agencies are involved in statutory or regulatory interpretation. 
 Broadly speaking, agencies interpret in at least three 
contexts.  One is where an agency administers a statute 
without any special authority to create new rights or 
obligations.  When disputes arise under this kind of agency 
interpretation, the courts give respect to the agency’s view to 
the extent it is persuasive, but they retain the primary 
responsibility for construing the statute.10  As such, the 
                                              
9 See also Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d at 1138; Boutilier, 387 U.S. 
at 123; Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 
F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. 
Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 507 (5th Cir. 2001); 
Columbia Nat’l Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1108 (6th 
Cir. 1995). 
 
10 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) 
(“[The agency interpretation is] not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of [its] authority [but is a] body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts . . . may 
properly resort for guidance.”); Christenson v. Harris Cnty., 
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“[Agency interpretations are] 
entitled to respect under [Skidmore], but only to the extent 
that [they] have the power to persuade.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is 
Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight”, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1147 (2012) 
(“Skidmore . . . is grounded in a construct of the agency as 
responsible expert, arguably possessing special knowledge of 
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standard of notice afforded to litigants about the meaning of 
the statute is not dissimilar to the standard of notice for civil 
statutes generally because the court, not the agency, is the 
ultimate arbiter of the statute’s meaning. 
 The second context is where an agency exercises its 
authority to fill gaps in a statutory scheme.  There the agency 
is primarily responsible for interpreting the statute because 
the courts must defer to any reasonable construction it adopts.  
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Courts appear to apply a more stringent 
standard of notice to civil regulations than civil statutes: 
parties are entitled to have “ascertainable certainty” of what 
conduct is legally required by the regulation.  See Chem. 
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(per curiam) (denying petitioners’ challenge that a recently 
promulgated EPA regulation fails fair notice principles); Nat’l 
Oilseed Processors Ass’n. v. OSHA, 769 F.3d 1173, 1183–84 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (denying petitioners’ challenge that a 
recently promulgated OSHA regulation fails fair notice 
principles). 
 The third context is where an agency interprets the 
meaning of its own regulation. Here also courts typically 
must defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation.11  We 
                                                                                                     
the statutory meaning a court should consider in reaching its 
own judgment.” (emphasis added)). 
 
11 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“Because 
the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary’s own 
regulations, his interpretation of it is . . . controlling unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. 
Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013) (“When an agency 
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and several of our sister circuits have stated that private 
parties are entitled to know with “ascertainable certainty” an 
agency’s interpretation of its regulation.  Sec’y of Labor v. 
Beverly Healthcare-Hillview, 541 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 
2008); Dravo Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. 
Comm’n, 613 F.2d 1227, 1232–33 (3d Cir. 1980).12  Indeed, 
                                                                                                     
interprets its own regulation, the Court, as a general rule, 
defers to it unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. 
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150–51 (1991) (“In situations in 
which the meaning of [regulatory] language is not free from 
doubt, the reviewing court should give effect to the agency’s 
interpretation so long as it is reasonable.” (alterations in 
original, internal quotations omitted)); Columbia Gas 
Transp., LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or Less in Penn Twp., 768 
F.3d 300, 313 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A]s an agency interpretation 
of its own regulation, it is deserving of deference.” (citing 
Decker)). 
 
12 See also Wis. Res. Prot. Council v. Flambeau Mining Co., 
727 F.3d 700, 708 (7th Cir. 2013); AJP Const., Inc. v. Sec’y 
of Labor, 357 F.3d 70, 75–76 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); Tex. 
Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 872 (D.C. Cir. 
1996); Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. 
Comm’n, 25 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1994); Diamond 
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 
528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976).  In fact, the Supreme Court 
applied Skidmore to an interpretation by an agency of a 
regulation it adopted instead of deferring to that interpretation 
because the latter would have “seriously undermine[d] the 
principle that agencies should provide regulated parties fair 
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“the due process clause prevents . . . deference from 
validating the application of a regulation that fails to give fair 
warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires.”  AJP Const., 
Inc., 357 F.3d at 75 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 A higher standard of fair notice applies in the second 
and third contexts than in the typical civil statutory 
interpretation case because agencies engage in interpretation 
differently than courts.  See Frank H. Easterbook, Judicial 
Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 3 
(2004) (“A judge who announces deference is approving a 
shift in interpretive method, not just a shift in the identity of 
the decider, as if a suit were being transferred to a court in a 
different venue.”).  In resolving ambiguity in statutes or 
regulations, courts generally adopt the best or most 
reasonable interpretation.  But, as the agency is often free to 
adopt any reasonable construction, it may impose higher 
legal obligations than required by the best interpretation.13   
                                                                                                     
warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires.”  
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 
2167 & n.15 (2012) (second alteration in original, internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Dravo, 613 F.2d at 1232–33 
and the “ascertainable certainty” standard). 
 
13 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (“If a statute is ambiguous, 
and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, 
Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s 
construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading 
differs from what the court believes is the best statutory 
interpretation.”); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1337 (“It is well 
established that an agency’s interpretation need not be the 
only possible reading of a  regulation—or even the best one—
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 Furthermore, courts generally resolve statutory 
ambiguity by applying traditional methods of construction.  
Private parties can reliably predict the court’s interpretation 
by applying the same methods.  In contrast, an agency may 
also rely on technical expertise and political values.14  It is 
harder to predict how an agency will construe a statute or 
regulation at some unspecified point in the future, particularly 
when that interpretation will depend on the “political views of 
                                                                                                     
to prevail.  When an agency interprets its own regulation, the 
Court, as a general rule, defers to it unless that interpretation 
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Auer, 519 U.S. at 462–63 
(“[The rule that Fair Labor Standards Act] exemptions are to 
be narrowly construed against . . . employers . . . is a rule 
governing judicial interpretation of statutes and regulations, 
not a limitation on the Secretary’s power to resolve 
ambiguities in his own regulations.  A rule requiring the 
Secretary to construe his own regulations narrowly would 
make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as 
broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by 
the statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
14 See Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 518 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (rejecting the applicability of the judicial 
retroactivity test to a new Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
interpretation because the “decision fill[ed] a statutory gap 
and [was] an exercise [of the agency’s] policymaking 
function”); Easterbrook, supra at 3 (“Judges in their own 
work forswear the methods that agencies employ” to interpret 
statutes, which include relying on “political pressure, the 
President’s view of happy outcomes, cost-benefit studies . . . 




the President in office at [that] time.”  Strauss, supra at 
1147.15 
 Wyndham argues it was entitled to “ascertainable 
certainty” of the FTC’s interpretation of what specific 
cybersecurity practices are required by § 45(a).  Yet it has 
contended repeatedly—no less than seven separate occasions 
in this case—that there is no FTC rule or adjudication about 
cybersecurity that merits deference here.  The necessary 
implication, one that Wyndham itself has explicitly drawn on 
two occasions noted below, is that federal courts are to 
interpret § 45(a) in the first instance to decide whether 
Wyndham’s conduct was unfair. 
 Wyndham’s argument has focused on the FTC’s 
motion to dismiss order in LabMD, an administrative case in 
which the agency is pursuing an unfairness claim based on 
allegedly inadequate cybersecurity.  LabMD Order, supra.  
Wyndham first argued in the District Court that the LabMD 
Order does not merit Chevron deference because “self-
serving, litigation-driven decisions . . . are entitled to no 
deference at all” and because the opinion adopted an 
impermissible construction of the statute.  Wyndham’s 
                                              
15 See also Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 981 (“[T]he 
agency . . . must consider varying interpretations and the 
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis . . . in response 
to . . . a change in administrations.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted, first omission in original)); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (“A change in 
administration brought about by the people casting their votes 
is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s 
reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its . . . regulations.”). 
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January 29, 2014 Letter at 1–2, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. 13-1887).   
 Second, Wyndham switched gears in its opening brief 
on appeal to us, arguing that LabMD does not merit Chevron 
deference because courts owe no deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of the “boundaries of Congress’ statutory 
delegation of authority to the agency.”  Wyndham Br. at 19–
20.   
 Third, in its reply brief it argued again that LabMD 
does not merit Chevron deference because it adopted an 
impermissible construction of the statute.  Wyndham Reply 
Br. at 14.  
 Fourth, Wyndham switched gears once more in a Rule 
28(j) letter, arguing that LabMD does not merit Chevron 
deference because the decision was nonfinal.  Wyndham’s 
February 6, 2015 Letter (citing LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 776 F.3d 
1275 (11th Cir. 2015)).  
 Fifth, at oral argument we asked Wyndham whether 
the FTC has decided that cybersecurity practices are unfair.  
Counsel answered: “No.  I don’t think consent decrees count, 
I don’t think the 2007 brochure counts, and I don’t think 
Chevron deference applies.  So are . . . they asking this 
federal court in the first instance . . . [?]  I think the answer to 
that question is yes . . . .”  Oral Arg. Tr. at 19.  
 Sixth, due to our continuing confusion about the 
parties’ positions on a number of issues in the case, we asked 
for supplemental briefing on certain questions, including 
whether the FTC had declared that cybersecurity practices 
can be unfair.  In response, Wyndham asserted that “the FTC 
has not declared unreasonable cybersecurity practices 
‘unfair.’”  Wyndham’s Supp. Memo. at 3.  Wyndham 
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explained further: “It follows from [our] answer to [that] 
question that the FTC is asking the federal courts to 
determine in the first instance that unreasonable cybersecurity 
practices qualify as ‘unfair’ trade practices under the FTC 
Act.”  Id. at 4. 
 Seventh, and most recently, Wyndham submitted a 
Rule 28(j) letter arguing that LabMD does not merit Chevron 
deference because it decided a question of “deep economic 
and political significance.”  Wyndham’s June 30, 2015 Letter 
(quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)). 
 Wyndham’s position is unmistakable: the FTC has not 
yet declared that cybersecurity practices can be unfair; there 
is no relevant FTC rule, adjudication or document that merits 
deference; and the FTC is asking the federal courts to 
interpret § 45(a) in the first instance to decide whether it 
prohibits the alleged conduct here.  The implication of this 
position is similarly clear: if the federal courts are to decide 
whether Wyndham’s conduct was unfair in the first instance 
under the statute without deferring to any FTC interpretation, 
then this case involves ordinary judicial interpretation of a 
civil statute, and the ascertainable certainty standard does not 
apply.  The relevant question is not whether Wyndham had 
fair notice of the FTC’s interpretation of the statute, but 
whether Wyndham had fair notice of what the statute itself 
requires. 
 Indeed, at oral argument we asked Wyndham whether 
the cases cited in its brief that apply the “ascertainable 
certainty” standard—all of which involve a court reviewing 
an agency adjudication16 or at least a court being asked to 
                                              
16 See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (vacating 
an FCC adjudication for lack of fair notice of an agency 
interpretation); PMD Produce Brokerage Corp. v. USDA, 234 
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defer to an agency interpretation17—apply where the court is 
to decide the meaning of the statute in the first instance.18  
Wyndham’s counsel responded, “I think it would, your 
Honor.  I think if you go to Ford Motor [Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 
1008 (9th Cir. 1981)], I think that’s what was happening 
there.”  Oral Arg. Tr. at 61.  But Ford Motor is readily 
distinguishable.  Unlike Wyndham, the petitioners there did 
not bring a fair notice claim under the Due Process Clause.  
Instead, they argued that, per NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 
416 U.S. 267 (1974), the FTC abused its discretion by 
proceeding through agency adjudication rather than 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating the dismissal of an 
administrative appeal issued by a Judicial Officer in the 
Department of Agriculture because the agency’s Rules of 
Practice failed to give fair notice of the deadline for filing an 
appeal); Gen. Elec. Co., 53 F.3d 1324 (vacating an EPA 
adjudication for lack of fair notice of the agency’s 
interpretation of a regulation); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 
380 U.S. 374 (1965) (reviewing an FTC adjudication that 
found liability). 
 
17 See In re Metro-East Mfg. Co., 655 F.2d 805, 810–12 (7th 
Cir. 1981) (declining to defer to an agency’s interpretation of 
its own regulation because the defendant could not have 
known with ascertainable certainty the agency’s 
interpretation). 
 
18 We asked, “All of your cases on fair notice pertain to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation or the statute 
that governs that agency.  Does this fair notice doctrine apply 
where it is a court announcing an interpretation of a statute in 




rulemaking.19  More importantly, the Ninth Circuit was 
reviewing an agency adjudication; it was not interpreting the 
meaning of the FTC Act in the first instance.   
 In addition, our understanding of Wyndham’s position 
is consistent with the District Court’s opinion, which 
concluded that the FTC has stated a claim under § 45(a) based 
on the Court’s interpretation of the statute and without any 
reference to LabMD or any other agency adjudication or 
                                              
19 To the extent Wyndham could have raised this argument, 
we do not read its briefs to do so.  Indeed, its opening brief 
appears to repudiate the theory.  Wyndham Br. at 38–39 
(“The district court below framed the fair notice issue here as 
whether ‘the FTC must formally promulgate regulations 
before bringing its unfairness claim.’  With all respect, that 
characterization of Wyndham’s position is a straw man.  
Wyndham has never disputed the general principle that 
administrative agencies have discretion to regulate through 
either rulemaking or adjudication.  See, e.g., [Bell Aerospace 
Co., 416 U.S. at 290–95].  Rather, Wyndham’s point is only 
that, however an agency chooses to proceed, it must provide 
regulated entities with constitutionally requisite fair notice.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has explained that where “it is doubtful [that] any generalized 
standard could be framed which would have more than 
marginal utility[, the agency] has reason to . . . develop[] its 
standards in a case-by-case manner.”  Bell Aerospace Co., 
416 U.S. at 294.  An agency’s “judgment that adjudication 
best serves this purpose is entitled to great weight.”  Id.  
Wyndham’s opening brief acknowledges that the FTC has 
given this rationale for proceeding by adjudication, Wyndham 




regulation.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. 
Supp. 3d 602, 621–26 (D.N.J. 2014).  
 We thus conclude that Wyndham was not entitled to 
know with ascertainable certainty the FTC’s interpretation of 
what cybersecurity practices are required by § 45(a).  Instead, 
the relevant question in this appeal is whether Wyndham had 
fair notice that its conduct could fall within the meaning of 
the statute.  If later proceedings in this case develop such that 
the proper resolution is to defer to an agency interpretation 
that gives rise to Wyndham’s liability, we leave to that time a 
fuller exploration of the level of notice required.  For now, 
however, it is enough to say that we accept Wyndham’s 
forceful contention that we are interpreting the FTC Act (as 
the District Court did).  As a necessary consequence, 
Wyndham is only entitled to notice of the meaning of the 
statute and not to the agency’s interpretation of the statute. 
B. Did Wyndham Have Fair Notice of the Meaning of 
§ 45(a)? 
 Having decided that Wyndham is entitled to notice of 
the meaning of the statute, we next consider whether the case 
should be dismissed based on fair notice principles. We do 
not read Wyndham’s briefs as arguing the company lacked 
fair notice that cybersecurity practices can, as a general 
matter, form the basis of an unfair practice under § 45(a).  
Wyndham argues instead it lacked notice of what specific 
cybersecurity practices are necessary to avoid liability.  We 
have little trouble rejecting this claim.   
 To begin with, Wyndham’s briefing focuses on the 
FTC’s failure to give notice of its interpretation of the statute 
and does not meaningfully argue that the statute itself fails 
fair notice principles.  We think it imprudent to hold a 100-
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year-old statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this 
case when we have not expressly been asked to do so.  
 Moreover, Wyndham is entitled to a relatively low 
level of statutory notice for several reasons.  Subsection 45(a) 
does not implicate any constitutional rights here.  Vill. of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 499 (1982).  It is a civil rather than criminal statute.20  Id. 
at 498–99.  And statutes regulating economic activity receive 
a “less strict” test because their “subject matter is often more 
narrow, and because businesses, which face economic 
demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to 
consult relevant legislation in advance of action.”  Id. at 498.  
 In this context, the relevant legal rule is not “so vague 
as to be ‘no rule or standard at all.’”  CMR D.N. Corp., 703 
F.3d at 632 (quoting Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123). Subsection 
45(n) asks whether “the act or practice causes or is likely to 
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”  
While far from precise, this standard informs parties that the 
relevant inquiry here is a cost-benefit analysis, Pa. Funeral 
Dirs. Ass’n v. FTC, 41 F.3d 81, 89–92 (3d Cir. 1992); Am. 
Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 975, that considers a number of 
relevant factors, including the probability and expected size 
of reasonably unavoidable harms to consumers given a 
certain level of cybersecurity and the costs to consumers that 
                                              
20 While civil statutes containing “quasi-criminal penalties 
may be subject to the more stringent review afforded criminal 
statutes,” Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d at 508, we do not know 
what remedy, if any, the District Court will impose.  And 
Wyndham’s briefing does not indicate what kinds of remedies 
it is exposed to in this proceeding. 
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would arise from investment in stronger cybersecurity.  We 
acknowledge there will be borderline cases where it is unclear 
if a particular company’s conduct falls below the requisite 
legal threshold.  But under a due process analysis a company 
is not entitled to such precision as would eliminate all close 
calls.  Cf. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) 
(“[T]he law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on 
his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently 
estimates it, some matter of degree.”).  Fair notice is satisfied 
here as long as the company can reasonably foresee that a 
court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning 
of the statute. 
 What appears to us is that Wyndham’s fair notice 
claim must be reviewed as an as-applied challenge.  See 
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975); San 
Filippo, 961 F.2d at 1136.  Yet Wyndham does not argue that 
its cybersecurity practices survive a reasonable interpretation 
of the cost-benefit analysis required by § 45(n).  One sentence 
in Wyndham’s reply brief says that its “view of what data-
security practices are unreasonable . . . is not necessarily the 
same as the FTC’s.” Wyndham Reply Br. at 23.  Too little 
and too late. 
 Wyndham’s as-applied challenge falls well short given 
the allegations in the FTC’s complaint.  As the FTC points 
out in its brief, the complaint does not allege that Wyndham 
used weak firewalls, IP address restrictions, encryption 
software, and passwords.  Rather, it alleges that Wyndham 
failed to use any firewall at critical network points, Compl. at 
¶ 24(a), did not restrict specific IP addresses at all, id. at 
¶ 24(j), did not use any encryption for certain customer files, 
id. at ¶ 24(b), and did not require some users to change their 
default or factory-setting passwords at all, id. at ¶ 24(f).  
Wyndham did not respond to this argument in its reply brief. 
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 Wyndham’s as-applied challenge is even weaker given 
it was hacked not one or two, but three, times.  At least after 
the second attack, it should have been painfully clear to 
Wyndham that a court could find its conduct failed the cost-
benefit analysis.  That said, we leave for another day whether 
Wyndham’s alleged cybersecurity practices do in fact fail, an 
issue the parties did not brief.  We merely note that certainly 
after the second time Wyndham was hacked, it was on notice 
of the possibility that a court could find that its practices fail 
the cost-benefit analysis. 
 Several other considerations reinforce our conclusion 
that Wyndham’s fair notice challenge fails.  In 2007 the FTC 
issued a guidebook, Protecting Personal Information: A 
Guide for Business, FTC Response Br. Attachment 1 
[hereinafter FTC Guidebook], which describes a “checklist[]” 
of practices that form a “sound data security plan.”  Id. at 3.  
The guidebook does not state that any particular practice is 
required by § 45(a),21 but it does counsel against many of the 
specific practices alleged here.  For instance, it recommends 
that companies “consider encrypting sensitive information 
that is stored on [a] computer network . . . [, c]heck . . . 
software vendors’ websites regularly for alerts about new 
vulnerabilities, and implement policies for installing vendor-
approved patches.”  Id. at 10.  It recommends using “a 
firewall to protect [a] computer from hacker attacks while it is 
connected to the Internet,” deciding “whether [to] install a 
‘border’ firewall where [a] network connects to the Internet,” 
and setting access controls that “determine who gets through 
                                              
21 For this reason, we agree with Wyndham that the 
guidebook could not, on its own, provide “ascertainable 
certainty” of the FTC’s interpretation of what specific 
cybersecurity practices fail § 45(n).  But as we have already 
explained, this is not the relevant question. 
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the firewall and what they will be allowed to see . . . to allow 
only trusted employees with a legitimate business need to 
access the network.”  Id. at 14.  It recommends “requiring that 
employees use ‘strong’ passwords” and cautions that 
“[h]ackers will first try words like . . . the software’s default 
password[] and other easy-to-guess choices.”  Id. at 12.  And 
it recommends implementing a “breach response plan,” id. at 
16, which includes “[i]nvestigat[ing] security incidents 
immediately and tak[ing] steps to close off existing 
vulnerabilities or threats to personal information,” id. at 23. 
 As the agency responsible for administering the 
statute, the FTC’s expert views about the characteristics of a 
“sound data security plan” could certainly have helped 
Wyndham determine in advance that its conduct might not 
survive the cost-benefit analysis. 
 Before the attacks, the FTC also filed complaints and 
entered into consent decrees in administrative cases raising 
unfairness claims based on inadequate corporate 
cybersecurity.  FTC Br. at 47 n.16.  The agency published 
these materials on its website and provided notice of proposed 
consent orders in the Federal Register.  Wyndham responds 
that the complaints cannot satisfy fair notice principles 
because they are not “adjudications on the merits.”22  
Wyndham Br. at 41.  But even where the “ascertainable 
certainty” standard applies to fair notice claims, courts 
regularly consider materials that are neither regulations nor 
“adjudications on the merits.”  See, e.g., United States v. 
                                              
22 We agree with Wyndham that the consent orders, which 
admit no liability and which focus on prospective 
requirements on the defendant, were of little use to it in trying 




Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 57 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that fair 
notice principles can be satisfied even where a regulation is 
vague if the agency “provide[d] a sufficient, publicly 
accessible statement” of the agency’s interpretation of the 
regulation); Beverly Healthcare-Hillview, 541 F.3d at 202 
(citing Lachman and treating an OSHA opinion letter as a 
“sufficient, publicly accessible statement”); Gen. Elec. Co., 
53 F.3d at 1329. That the FTC commissioners—who must 
vote on whether to issue a complaint, 16 C.F.R. § 3.11(a); 
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, FTC Practice and Procedure 
Manual 160–61 (2007)—believe that alleged cybersecurity 
practices fail the cost-benefit analysis of § 45(n) certainly 
helps companies with similar practices apprehend the 
possibility that their cybersecurity could fail as well.23 
                                              
23 We recognize it may be unfair to expect private parties 
back in 2008 to have examined FTC complaints or consent 
decrees.  Indeed, these may not be the kinds of legal 
documents they typically consulted.  At oral argument we 
asked how private parties in 2008 would have known to 
consult them.  The FTC’s only answer was that “if you’re a 
careful general counsel you do pay attention to what the FTC 
is doing, and you do look at these things.”  Oral Arg. Tr. at 
51.  We also asked whether the FTC has “informed the public 
that it needs to look at complaints and consent decrees for 
guidance,” and the Commission could offer no examples.  Id. 
at 52.   But Wyndham does not appear to argue it was unaware 
of the consent decrees and complaints; it claims only that they 
did not give notice of what the law requires.  Wyndham 
Reply Br. at 25 (“The fact that the FTC publishes these 
materials on its website and provides notice in the Federal 
Register, moreover, is immaterial—the problem is not that 
Wyndham lacked notice of the consent decrees [which 
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 Wyndham next contends that the individual allegations 
in the complaints are too vague to be relevant to the fair 
notice analysis.  Wyndham Br. at 41–42.  It does not, 
however, identify any specific examples.  And as the Table 
below reveals, the individual allegations were specific and 
similar to those here in at least one of the four or five24 
cybersecurity-related unfair-practice complaints that issued 
prior to the first attack.  
 Wyndham also argues that, even if the individual 
allegations are not vague, the complaints “fail to spell out 
what specific cybersecurity practices . . . actually triggered 
the alleged violation, . . . provid[ing] only a . . . description of 
certain alleged problems that, ‘taken together,’” fail the cost-
benefit analysis.  Wyndham Br. at 42 (emphasis in original). 
We part with it on two fronts.  First, even if the complaints do 
not specify which allegations, in the Commission’s view, 
form the necessary and sufficient conditions of the alleged 
violation, they can still help companies apprehend the 
possibility of liability under the statute.  Second, as the Table 
below shows, Wyndham cannot argue that the complaints fail 
to give notice of the necessary and sufficient conditions of an 
                                                                                                     
reference the complaints] but that consent decrees [and 
presumably complaints] by their nature do not give notice of 
what Section 5 requires.” (emphases in original, citations and 
internal quotations omitted)). 
 
24 The FTC asserts that five such complaints issued prior to 
the first attack in April 2008. See FTC Br. at 47–48 n.16.  
There is some ambiguity, however, about whether one of 
them issued several months later. See Complaint, TJX Co., 
No. C-4227 (FTC 2008) (stating that the complaint was 
issued on July 29, 2008).  We note that this complaint also 
shares significant parallels with the allegations here.  
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alleged § 45(a) violation when all of the allegations in at least 
one of the relevant four or five complaints have close 
corollaries here.  See Complaint, CardSystems Solutions, Inc., 
No. C-4168 (FTC 2006) [hereinafter CCS]. 
Table: Comparing CSS and Wyndham Complaints 
  CSS Wyndham 
1 Created unnecessary risks to 
personal information by storing 
it in a vulnerable format for up 
to 30 days, CSS at ¶ 6(1). 
Allowed software at hotels to 
store payment card information 
in clear readable text, Compl. at 
¶ 24(b). 
2 Did not adequately assess the 
vulnerability of its web 
application and computer 
network to commonly known or 
reasonably foreseeable attacks; 
did not implement simple, low-
cost and readily available 
defenses to such attacks, CSS at 
¶ 6(2)–(3). 
Failed to monitor network for 
the malware used in a previous 
intrusion, Compl. at ¶ 24(i), 
which was then reused by 
hackers later to access the 
system again, id. at ¶ 34. 
3 Failed to use strong passwords 
to prevent a hacker from gaining 
control over computers on its 
computer network and access to 
personal information stored on 
the network, CSS at ¶ 6(4). 
Did not employ common 
methods to require user IDs and 
passwords that are difficult for 
hackers to guess.  E.g., allowed 
remote access to a hotel’s 
property management system 
that used default/factory setting 
passwords, Compl. at ¶ 24(f). 
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4 Did not use readily available 
security measures to limit access 
between computers on its 
network and between those 
computers and the Internet, CSS 
at ¶ 6(5). 
Did not use readily available 
security measures, such as 
firewalls, to limit access 
between and among hotels’ 
property management systems, 
the Wyndham network, and the 
Internet, Compl. at ¶ 24(a). 
5 Failed to employ sufficient 
measures to detect unauthorized 
access to personal information or 
to conduct security 
investigations, CSS at ¶ 6(6). 
Failed to employ reasonable 
measures to detect and prevent 
unauthorized access to computer 
network or to conduct security 
investigations, Compl. at 
¶ 24(h). 
 In sum, we have little trouble rejecting Wyndham’s 
fair notice claim. 
V. Conclusion 
 The three requirements in § 45(n) may be necessary 
rather than sufficient conditions of an unfair practice, but we 
are not persuaded that any other requirements proposed by 
Wyndham pose a serious challenge to the FTC’s claim here.  
Furthermore, Wyndham repeatedly argued there is no FTC 
interpretation of § 45(a) or (n) to which the federal courts 
must defer in this case, and, as a result, the courts must 
interpret the meaning of the statute as it applies to 
Wyndham’s conduct in the first instance.  Thus, Wyndham 
cannot argue it was entitled to know with ascertainable 
certainty the cybersecurity standards by which the FTC 
expected it to conform.  Instead, the company can only claim 
that it lacked fair notice of the meaning of the statute itself—a 
47 
 
theory it did not meaningfully raise and that we strongly 
suspect would be unpersuasive under the facts of this case. 
 We thus affirm the District Court’s decision. 
